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while at the same time acknowledging that seeking for truth has less to do with the final 
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But you shall hear from me the whole truth
Plato, Apology of Socrates
1. Introduction
Veritas, veritatum, omnia veritas.1 It is an inescapable fact that truth and the 
search for truth are at present very much en vogue in civil litigation. Indeed, truth 
is something we cannot easily have enough of: no sensible human being will be 
against it. the question however what is and how to find ‘the truth’ is not so easy to 
answer, even for jurists who have no affinity with philosophy. truth in the opinion of 
many belongs to the exclusive domain of procedural law. substantive law does not 
have much in common with ‘truth’ and ‘search for truth.’  the question arises whether 
this trend always increases the quality of the outcome of a civil procedure. on the 
one hand we may consider as positive that the courts do not content themselves 
with the cold result of facts that are asserted and challenged in a civil lawsuit. 
on the other hand we must face the fact that more often than not it is merely an 
illusion to expect that in a civil lawsuit the truth – that is: the real facts, as they 
happened in reality between the parties – can be established beyond reasonable 
doubt. Nietzsches cynicism: „die wahrheit ist eine Illusion, von der man vergessen 
hat, das sie eine ist“2 is to be avoided at all times in civil litigation, while on the other 
hand the parties involved, the court and society need to realize that seeking the 
truth has less to do with the final result than with the attitude of the court in its 
quest for a just decision. For this reason and against this background the interest 
for evidence in civil litigation in russia and in the Netherlands is fully justified. 
Not so much in the sense that it suggests that the truth can be found, but mainly 
in the context of the courts’ attitude that is aimed at finding out the truth.3 No 
justice can be accomplished in a civil procedure in which there has not been at least 
undertaken a serious effort to find out the truth in the conflict at stake. Evidence 
1  V. van den Brink, De waarheid is van iedereen, 2014(5) Nederlands tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk recht; Eric 
tjong tjin tai, Waarheid in het burgerlijk proces, bespreking NJV preadvies, 87(22) Nederlands Juristenblad 
(2012), available at <https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1486706/Bespreking_de_groot_NJV_2012.pdf> 
(accessed Mar. 11, 2015).
2  Friedrich Nietzsche, Über wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen sinne (1873), kap. 1, <http://www.uni-
erfurt.de/fileadmin/public-docs/Literaturwissenschaft/ndl/Material_schmidt/Nietzsche_%C3%9Cber_
wahrheit.pdf> (accessed Mar. 11, 2015): „was ist also wahrheit? Ein bewegliches heer von Metaphern, 
Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine summe von menschlichen relationen, die, poetisch und 
rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem gebrauch einem Volke 
fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: die wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen 
hat, daß sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die 
ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen, in Betracht kommen.“
3  g. van rijssen & r.A. van der Pol, Civiel deskundigenbewijs, 2013(4) tijdschrift voor Civiele rechtspleging; 
willem d.h. Asser, Mr. C. Assers handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht, 
3 Procesrecht: Bewijs 71 (kluwer 2013).
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law chiefly concerns itself with the methods by which facts are being established 
in a civil lawsuit. It is the facts that make up for the basis of the parties’ claims and 
the court’s decision, and it is from this point of view that there is reason to assume 
that facts are taken seriously both by the parties and by the courts. however, this 
is not self-evident and is often depending on the perspective one takes when 
looking at a civil lawsuit. dutch lawyers often have a different opinion when it 
concerns the importance of seeking the truth than many judges have, and scholarly 
opinions tend to go in various directions. In this essay I will limit myself to briefly 
sketching a few basics of the dutch civil procedure, seen from a judges’ perspective, 
in the course of which I will also touch on a few aspects of the present discussion 
concerning the importance of facts and truth in the dutch civil procedure: seeking 
the truth, the importance of establishing the facts4 and, in this context, the question 
how active judges may behave in their pursuit for true facts. subsequently the issue 
will be addressed from the russian perspective.
2. We Need Facts
Charles dickens begins his XIXth century novel of social injustice ‘hard times’ with 
‘the one thing Needful:’5
Now, what I want is, facts. teach these boys and girls nothing but facts. Facts 
alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. you 
can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will 
ever be of any service to them. this is the principle on which I bring up my 
own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. 
stick to facts, sir!
this ‘principle’ more or less applies to any civil procedure. the principle of seeking 
the truth can be used as an umbrella that includes all activities of the parties and the 
court that have as objective the establishment of the relevant facts, that is those facts 
that the court needs to ground its decision on. It includes the relation between facts 
and law, the division of tasks between parties and court, but also third-party duties 
such as the obligation of witnesses to supply the court with relevant information.6 
In this context it is worth mentioning that the dutch supreme Court ruled in several 
of its recent judgments that it is a weighty social interest that in a court of law the 
4  See on this subject from the comparative perspective remme Verkerk, Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation: 
A Comparative Perspective (Intersentia 2010).
5  Charles dickens, hard times (Vintage Classics 2012).
6  r.h. de Bock, tussen waarheid en onzekerheid: over het vaststellen van feiten in de civiele procedure 
(= 9 Burgerlijk Proces & Praktijk) (rob rutgers et al., eds.) (kluwer 2011).
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truth can be found.7 A just judicial decision can be realized only on the basis of 
a correct application of legal norms based on facts that are true. the distinguished 
dutch jurist Paul scholten in his Algemeen Deel (general Part) phrased it briefly as 
follows: ‘It is in the facts that the law is to be found.’8 It is generally accepted that the 
examination of the facts in a civil procedure is aimed at finding the material truth of 
these facts:9 did they happen in reality? seeking the truth by the courts is, however, 
not mentioned in the overriding objectives of the 1999 English Civil Procedure rules 
(CPr), for the mere reason that ‘seeking the truth is so obviously part of the court’s 
role that it does not need to be stated expressly in the rules.’ the procedural rules 
do not exist ‘to establish the court’s basic constitutional purpose: namely, to decide 
cases in accordance with the facts and applicable law.’10 I can but fully agree with 
Asser that this can be said for all jurisdictions.11 As mentioned before, seeking the 
truth aims mainly at establishing facts that are relevant for the court’s decision and 
takes place in a procedure in which rules are guiding the division of roles between 
the court and the parties, as well as the acquiring of information and the verification 
thereof (by way of evidence, assessment of evidence, expert-reports, discovery and 
exhibition duties). Before highlighting some aspects of the procedural debate in 
the Netherlands – establishing of facts and evidence – it seems to make sense to 
roughly sketch a few important aspects of dutch civil procedure.
3. In Short: The Dutch Procedural Model
In the Netherlands the administration of justice in all civil and commercial law cases 
is in the hands of eleven courts of the first instance (district courts (rechtbanken)), 
four courts of appeal (gerechtshoven) and the supreme Court (hoge raad). only the 
district courts and the courts of appeal examine facts; the supreme Court’s authority 
is limited to supervising the correct application of norms of substantial law and 
procedural law – norms of international law included – by the courts of appeal. the 
7  uitgeversmaatschappij de telegraaf B.V. / de staat der Nederlanden, hr 11 juli 2008, NJ 2009/451 (ann. 
EJd), available at <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:hr:2008:BC8421> 
(accessed Mar. 11, 2015); [de man] / [de vrouw], hr 10 april 2009, NJ 2010/471 (ann. CJMk), available 
at <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:hr:2009:Bg9470> (accessed Mar. 
11, 2015); [Eiser] / Nederlandse Israëlitische hoofdsynagoge, hr 18 maart 2011, NJ 2012/315 (ann. 
CJMk), <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:hr:2011:BP0571> (accessed 
Mar. 11, 2015).
8  Paul scholten, Mr. C. Assers handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht, 
Algemeen deel 9 (w.E.J. tjeenk willink 1974).
9  Jan B.M. Vranken, Mr. C. Assers handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht, 
Algemeen deel ****, Een synthese 62–82 (kluwer 2014).
10  Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practise ¶ 1.15 (sweet & Maxwell 2006).
11  Asser, supra n. 3, at 75 (with many references).
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supreme Court also supervises the unity of the law and legal development.12 As far 
as the appeal instance is concerned it suffices to mention that – contrary to many 
other jurisdictions – the appeal procedure may include a whole new assessment of 
the case in which the parties can bring forward new facts, new or additional claims, 
legal grounds and / or new challenges. the task of the appeal court is therefore not 
restricted to a mere assessment of the judgment of the district court, as is the case in 
some jurisdictions. For practical reasons however, this is not the place to go into the 
particulars of the appeal procedure.13 I will therefore limit myself to relevant aspects 
that apply both to first and second instance civil procedures.14
the characteristics of the dutch procedural model find their roots in the roman-
canonic law tradition: a mainly written procedure with a dominant role of the court 
concerning the examination of the facts and an important role for professional 
lawyers.15 Legal representation before the court is mandatory in all cases that 
exceed an amount of € 25,000, whereas in the appeal instances and in the cassation 
instance legal representation by lawyers is mandatory in all cases. recent reforms 
have strengthened the dominant role of the courts, particularly where it concerns 
fact-finding. Article 21 of the dutch Civil Procedure Code [hereinafter dCPC] obliges 
the parties to bring forward all those facts that are relevant for the court’s decision 
‘complete and in accordance with the truth.’ Furthermore the court has it in its power to 
oblige the parties at any moment to clarify particular assertions as well as to submit 
certain documents (Art. 22 dCPC).
Next to this since the 2002 reforms16 an oral hearing (comparitie) takes place 
in practically every first instance case, but only after both parties have submitted 
their respective court documents, the plaintiff: a writ of summons (containing the 
plaintiffs’ allegations), and the defense: its statement of answer (eventually containing 
a counter-claim).
given the dominant role of the courts with respect to the examination of relevant 
facts, it will not come as a surprise that dutch legal culture requires a high degree 
12  E. korthals Altes & h.A. groen, Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk recht, 7 Procesrecht: Cassatie in burgerlijke zaken (kluwer 2005).
13  A great survey on the dutch style appeal procedure is given by F.B. Bakels et al., Mr. C. Assers 
handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht, 4 Procesrecht: hoger beroep 
(kluwer 2009).
14  there exists only one „wetboek van burgerlijke rechtsvordering” (Civil Procedure Code), that contains 
the rules of civil procedure for the district courts, the courts of appeal and the supreme Court. Apart 
from that, many (sub)rules are to be found in the supreme Courts’ jurisprudence.
15  Asser, supra n. 3, at 2.
16  See for an overview of the reforms C.h. (remco) van rhee & remme Verkerk, The Netherlands: 
A No-Nonsense Approach to Civil Procedure Reform, in Civil Litigation in China and Europe: Essays 
on the role of the Judge and the Parties (= 31 Ius gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and 
Justice) 259–280 (C.h. (remco) van rhee & Fu yulin, eds.)  (springer 2014).
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of professional, cooperative, behaviour between the parties and the court. the 
reason behind it lies in the awareness that the parties and the court both bear 
equal responsibility for a speedy, efficient and effective process. Both the parties and 
court therefore are required to actively participate to ensure procedural (Art. 6 of the 
European Convention on human rights [hereinafter EChr]) and substantial justice. 
this implies that parties may have a duty not only to inform the court completely 
and correctly, but also that they inform the other party equally. one might even 
conclude that the parties have an obligation to cooperate in revealing the truth, 
that they must lay their cards on the table. Non-cooperative, even oppositional, 
behaviour must be sanctioned. If we try to formulate a standard by which to assess 
the parties’ procedural behaviour, it should be the central open norm of dutch civil 
procedure law, that is ‘the requirements of a good process order,’ from which the 
courts can concretize a duty to cooperate in any particular situation. Moreover, from 
this viewpoint the risk that both parties, and the court, construe their own reality 
can be substantially minimized.17
4. How Civil Judges Reason
two core legal provisions should not be overlooked because they emphasize the 
division of roles between the court and the parties in the procedural debate that 
focuses on the claimants’ demands and the challenges by the defense. Article 24 
dCPC orders the court to examine and decide each case on the basis of what is 
asserted by the plaintiff and the defense, while Art. 25 dCPC orders the court to ex 
officio supplement the legal foundation. In other words: the courts’ decision must be 
firmly grounded in the parties’ positions and the law. Article 24 dCPC thus emphasizes 
the party autonomy and restricts on reasonable grounds the courts’ freedom to freely 
give a decision the court may find the most reasonable one. Fundamental procedural 
principles – such as the parties’ autonomy and hearing both parties – result in the 
basic assumption that the court does not ground its decision on facts that are not 
asserted or have not been established, and that it neither supplements the claim or 
defense with a legal foundation that has no basis in the parties’ positions.18 It is this 
fundamental starting point regarding the division of roles between the courts and 
the parties’ (that is: their lawyers) that regularly causes difficulties in daily practice.19 
It all comes down to the question of how much freedom is given to the courts in 
17  Asser, supra n. 3, at 80.
18  Vranken, supra n. 10, at 68 (seeking truth versus party autonomy).
19  there is almost a boundless amount of literature and supreme Court jurisprudence on this subject. 
See, e.g., A.C. van schaick, Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk 
recht, 2 Procesrecht: Eerste aanleg (kluwer 2011) (Ch. 6 ‘the Procedural debate. the division of 
roles between the Parties and the Courts’ with many footnotes); see also Asser, supra n. 3 (Ch. 4 ‘the 
Boundaries of the search for truth’ also with many references in footnotes).
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their search for truth. Can a clear boundary be established in general terms? I will go 
into this debate in the next section. For the time being it suffices to realize that the 
starting point as far as facts and legal foundation is concerned is upon the parties.
Let us face the question of how the court establishes those facts that it finds to 
be relevant for its decision? In other words: when does an asserted fact become an 
established fact? to answer this question we must distinguish between the following 
seven stages:20
1) asserting;
2) challenging;
3) burden of proof;
4) offer to proof;
5) order to furnish evidence (parol evidence and / or documentary evidence);
6) produce evidence;
7) assessing the evidence by the court.
It is of essential importance – every qualified lawyer should realize this – that these 
consecutive stages are being followed in the process of analyzing; none should be 
missed. It goes without saying that the transition from stage 2 to stage 3 is the most 
important one in the limited context of this article, that is the stage from ‘asserting 
and challenging’ to ‘evidence.’ Let us therefore focus on three important stages.
Stage 1. on the plaintiff who files a claim rests the obligation – on pain of 
rejection of the claim – to assert facts that support the allegations made in the writ 
of summons and that may support the relief sought to be awarded by the court. the 
mere assertion ‘I want the defendant to be condemned to pay € 50,000’ will clearly 
not suffice. the plaintiff will have to assert sufficient facts to substantiate all elements 
prescribed by the substantial law. For instance: the party that claims € 50,000 – 
damages for breach of a contractual obligation, will have at least to start asserting 
the elements a) ‘contract,’ b) ‘breach,’ c) ‘damages,’ and d) ‘causality.’ Furthermore, he 
will also have to substantiate – that is: concretize – these respective elements. In 
the same example: what is the obligation the other party supposedly has breached, 
on what contract is this obligation based (have the parties used a written contract 
or an oral one?), and what specific damages were caused by this breach? the 
plaintiff therefore has to make sure that his claim is given sufficient substantiation, 
both in terms of the invoked elements of substantial law and with regard to the 
substantiation with alleged facts of these respective elements. If the court finds that 
the plaintiff has not fulfilled its obligation in either way, the claim will be rejected. 
stage 2 will not be reached.
Stage 2. only when the court has affirmed that the plaintiff has fulfilled his 
obligation under stage 1, stage 2 is entered. In that stage the court has to ask itself 
20  V. van den Brink, Stellen, betwisten bewijzen – een handleiding, 2008(4) Praktisch Procederen; Margreet 
J.A.M. Ahsmann, de weg naar het civiele vonnis (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011).
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the question whether the defense has sufficiently challenged the facts asserted by 
the plaintiff in his court document. If the court comes to the conclusion that this is not 
the case, it has to establish these facts as uncontested (Art. 149(1) dCPC).21 If however 
an asserted fact is challenged, the court will carefully direct the ‘magnifying glass’ 
on the quality of both sides’ assertions. Both parties must sufficiently substantiate 
and concretize their respective assertions and challenges. the more concrete the 
assertions of one party are, the more the other party may be expected to substantiate 
and concretize his assertions / challenges and vice versa. It is difficult to formulate 
hard and fast standards of what in general may be expected of both parties, as this 
will depend on the specific circumstances of each case. what can be said however 
is that the court, before it rules that one of the parties has not sufficiently fulfilled its 
obligation to substantiate and concretize facts stated in the context of the claim or 
the challenge thereof, must ask itself the question: what else could – and therefore: 
should – this party have come up with? As it is considered a fundamental principle 
of fair trial that each judicial decision is reasoned at least to the extent that it gives 
sufficient insight into the court’s line of reasoning in order to ensure that its decision 
is ‘verifiable and acceptable’22 both for the parties, the higher courts and third parties 
alike, the court should also explain why it finds that one party could and should have 
substantiated its assertions or challenges more extensively, before it rejects either 
the claim or the position taken by the defense. here lies anyway an important task 
for the more active judge during a court hearing.
to round off: only when the court finds that both the substantiation of asserted facts 
by the claimant and the substantiation of the challenges by the defense are of sufficient 
quality, does the question of the burden of proof arise. that is the third stage.
Stage 3. Article 150 dCPC contains the basic rule that on the party that calls upon 
the legal effects of certain asserted facts or rights, rests the burden of proof of these 
facts or rights. Consequently it is this party that bears the risk that the court is not 
able to establish these facts or rights (‘non liquet’) and that the claim, insofar as it 
is grounded on these facts or rights, must be rejected. therefore we may conclude 
that the party who asserts facts to substantiate his appeal to a certain legal effect 
must prove those facts to be truthful. Asserting facts / rights and evidence therefore 
go hand in hand. Let me go back to the example given in stage 1. It is clear that 
the burden of proof of the asserted facts that substantiate the above-mentioned 
21  this must be seen as an example of the party autonomy.
22  See the constant jurisprudence of the supreme Court: Vredo / Veenhuis, hr 4 juni 1993, NJ 1993/659 
(ann. dwFV); Finkenburgh / Van Mansum, hr 16 oktober 1998, NJ 1999/7; [Eiseressen 1–5] / 
[Verweerders 1–6], hr 25 oktober 2002, NJ 2003/171 (ann. MVs), available at <http://uitspraken.
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:hr:2002:AE4364> (accessed Mar. 11, 2015). It shows 
the influence of Art. 6(1) EChr on civil procedure law. See A. hammerstein, De invloed van artikel 
6 lid 1 EVRM op het burgerlijk procesrecht, in Europeanisering van het Nederlands recht: opstellen 
aangeboden aan Mr. w.E. haak 220–233 (g.J.M. Corstens et al., eds.) (kluwer 2004).
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elements a)–d) is on the claimant, taken that they are sufficiently challenged by the 
defense.23 however, if the defense not only challenges these facts by denying that any 
breach of contract has been committed by her, but also files a counterclaim asserting 
that, on the contrary, it was not the defense but the claimant who has committed 
a breach of contract and is therefore liable to pay damages, the burden of proof of 
the facts that support that argument is on the defense.24 the ratio thereof lies in the 
basic rule of Art. 150 dCPC.
there remains much more to be said about the burden of proof and all its 
complicated side-alleys, as it is the hinge around which the court’s decision turns: the 
one who has to prove facts or rights also bears the risk that they can not be established. 
this goes beyond the scope of this article, and deserves a separate publication.
I will leave the stages 4–6 but will instead say a few words about stage 7, the 
assessment by the courts of the evidence.
Stage 7. when it comes to the question ‘true’ or ‘not true,’ one would expect that 
either the law or the jurisprudence would set the clear standards by which the 
courts have to assess and decide whether evidence of a fact has been produced. 
this is not the case. dutch law takes the so-called free assessment of evidence by 
the courts in Art. 152(2) dCPC as a principle, where it stipulates: ‘the assessment of 
evidence is left to the court’s judgment, unless prescribed otherwise by the law.’  the 
law therefore does not give the court much support when faced with the central 
question as to when it may, or must, assume a certain fact has been proven. over 
the years literature and jurisprudence have developed the standard of a ‘reasonable 
degree of certainty’ by which to assess evidence and to assume a fact proven. It is 
clear that such a standard gives the courts a wide margin of appreciation when it 
comes to assessing evidence. when is a court convinced, and when is it not?25 For this 
reason some jurists assert with some justification that the decision whether a certain 
fact has been proven depends to a high degree on the subjective judgment of the 
members of the court in the concrete case. this certainly has ground, in particular 
when it comes to assessing witnesses’ statements as so often is the case in dutch 
courts where evidence by witnesses’ is allowed in many situations. It is hard to predict 
in advance how much ‘reasonable certainty’ a court needs to reach the conclusion 
that evidence of a fact has been produced. this means there exists a high degree 
of legal uncertainty for those who have to decide whether to start a lawsuit or to 
start a defense. It is against this background that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
judge ruth de Bock in her recent thesis26 argued that a more serious reasoning may 
23  And if not, the court has to establish them on the basis of Art. 149 dCPC.
24  Asser, supra n. 3, has a lot to say about this important issue in Ch. 9.
25  Vranken, supra n. 10, at 76 (with a reference to Art. 21.1 ALI / unidroit Principles of transnational Civil 
Procedures 2004: ‘Facts are considered proven when the court is reasonably convinced of their truth’).
26  de Bock, supra n. 7.
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be expected with regard to the court’s judgment that evidence of a certain fact or 
right has been produced. In this context she proposes the following standard:
A fact is proven by the civil law courts when it can reasonably be concluded 
from the available evidence that said fact has taken place, while at the same 
time the available evidence does not leave open the possibility that the version 
of the facts as asserted by the other party has taken place, while just as little can 
be said that evidence, that reasonably may have been expected, is lacking.
It may be argued that the latter standard leaves as much subjectivity to the courts 
as the former one. however, the value of the point she makes lies primarily in the 
notion of the importance of the court’s task to reason its judgment that evidence 
of a certain fact or right has, or has not, been produced in the best possible way. At 
the same time it makes us realize the limitations the court faces while reaching the 
point on which it has to decide: ‘true’ or ‘not true.’27 More in general it can be said that 
de Bock’s thesis provides insight into every-day dilemmas of legal practice around 
the theme of ‘seeking the truth’ and it is certainly stimulating to reflect on how and 
where judges can do better.
5. (Too) Active Judges?
there remains one interesting issue to be briefly touched on, and that is the 
difference of opinion between those who are advocating a strictly maintained party 
autonomy and the court’s passiveness where facts and rights are concerned, versus 
those who are advocating a more inquisitorial, active, role of judges when it comes 
to seeking the true facts.
the oral hearing (‘the parties day in court’) I mentioned in sec. 2, which takes 
place in practically every first instance case, marks a very important moment in 
the procedural debate between the parties and the court (mostly a one-judge 
panel). As a rule, no further exchange of court documents is permitted after this 
moment, although exceptions do exist. After the oral hearing the court sets a date 
for its written judgment, usually six weeks later. this can be either an interlocutory 
judgment – e.g., ordering one of the parties to produce (further) evidence – or a final 
judgment, awarding or rejecting the claim.
In the opinion of those jurists who are adherents of a strictly maintained party 
autonomy and the courts’ passiveness, the responsibility for asserting legal grounds, 
challenges, and the necessary facts that support these grounds and challenges rests 
exclusively on the parties; in their vision the court’s role in the debate should be strictly 
27  See also the interesting review of de Bock’s thesis by Prof. Mr. g. de groot, De vaststelling van feiten 
in de civiele procedure, 2012(2) tijdschrift voor Civiele rechtspleging.
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limited to those facts and grounds that are in dispute and to the sustainability of the 
claim and the challenges thereof by the defense. In other words: the parties have 
a dispute, they both want to ‘win their case’ and this does not correspond with the idea 
that the parties, together with the court, bear a common responsibility for ‘the best 
possible outcome.’ As a consequence this vision is opposing the very idea of judges 
actively collecting grounds and facts from the court documents which he or she finds 
reasonable for reaching a just decision. this rather formal approach is necessary in the 
eyes of its adherents, because active and helping judges create sloppy litigators and 
this, in turn, stands in the way of the realization of existing civil rights.28
Many judges will agree that the extent to which the court can actively participate 
in the procedural debate between the parties is limited. however, the rather formal 
and one-sided view of the adherents of a strict party autonomy should be criticized 
on (at least) the following grounds.29
First, this view starts from the incorrect assumption that as a rule, the parties 
are represented by highly qualified lawyers / litigators. For matters with damages 
up to € 25,000 the parties are not required to retain legal representation – parties 
can therefore appear in person – and many lawyers tend to be sloppy litigators. 
this often has the consequence that court documents lack clear legal grounds and 
challenges, and that hardly any attention is paid to the facts that have in reality 
occurred and that should form the foundation of the asserted legal grounds and 
challenges thereof. shouldn’t one then, given this reality, expect judges to do their 
best to try to examine and clarify the facts that took place in reality and ask questions 
about the legal grounds that are invoked and the challenges thereof?
second, judges, unlike many lawyers, consider a civil dispute not from the 
perspective of a tactical match between two equally equipped parties and their 
respective lawyers, but from the perspective of seeking the truth because – as 
I argued in the foregoing – seeking truth is the natural orientation of judges in the 
examination of the facts. this orientation demands active judges. giving up on 
seeking truth as a principle that serves as a guideline for any civil law judge will have 
as a consequence that the establishment of facts will become an arbitrary business 
and that procedure will be merely procedure.30
Last but not least, dysfunctioning lawyers tend to create a judges’ dilemma: will he 
or she decide the case exclusively on the basis of the facts, grounds and arguments 
presented to him in often nicely composed court documents – and ‘reprimand’ the 
28  A strong adherent of this ‘doctrine’ is prof. Mr. A.C. van schaick in his oration „het burgerlijk recht de 
baas? over de verwevenheid van burgerlijk recht en burgerlijk procesrecht” (kluwer 2009); see also 
schaick, supra n. 20.
29  See r.A. van der Pol & d.t. Boks, Boekbespreking van A.C. van Schaick, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot 
de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht, Procesrecht, Deel 2, Eerste aanleg, 2011, 2012(2) 
tijdschrift voor Civiele rechtspleging.
30  de Bock, supra n. 7.
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sloppy lawyer – or will he actively examine the facts of the case? the first option is not 
very attractive, as it is not the task of the court to point out to lawyers and their clients 
that the judgment was partly due to a ‘wrong procedural attitude.’ Furthermore, it 
must be kept in mind that the court’s effort is aimed at achieving the purpose of the 
procedure, namely the clarification of facts, grounds, and challenges in order to be able 
to decide as much as possible the true conflict that keeps the parties divided, instead of 
a more or less hypothetical dispute. however it remains important for judges to keep 
in mind the limits of being (too) active, more in particular where it concerns so-called 
‘untouched issues.’ According to supreme Court jurisprudence the judge is not free to 
base his decision on legal grounds or challenges that could be deduced from certain 
facts and circumstances, but that have not been asserted by the plaintiff as a basis for 
his claim or by the defense as a basis for his challenge, because by doing so the other 
parties fundamental right to be heard could be violated.31 this fundamental principle of 
Art. 6 EChr and Art.19 dCPC32 has become the bottom line for active judges.
6. Russian Mirror
My learned co-author in this article, Judge ruth van der Pol, elucidated three 
basic questions that arise in regards to the truth in the civil process. they are as 
follows: 1) whether courts should or have to seek for truth in civil process; 2) what 
is the truth that they should or have to seek in the process; and 3) how do courts 
seek for truth? this way to analyze our topic seems to be reasonable. For russia, all 
three questions are problematic.
6.1. Should Russian Courts Seek for Truth in Civil Process?
It can be firmly said at the outset that civil courts in russia are not expressly 
required by law to find the truth. this word, truth (or istina in russian), is not even 
mentioned in russian primary law. Nevertheless, it is used very actively in the 
doctrine, which still influences the conscience of judges and revives what has been 
expressly abdicated in black letter law.
A separate issue is whether the courts actually have to seek for truth even if they 
are not required to do that by law. this way to formulate the first question in our 
analysis refers not to the law but to the realities of our life, in which the court just 
cannot avoid seeking for truth in order to carry out its judicial function. My learned 
co-author mentioned this argument and it seems quite strong so long as we consider 
that the civil process can reveal and actually does reveal truth. this is already the 
31  E.oN Benelux generation N.V. / [Verweerder], hr 31 maart 2006, NJ 2006/233, available at <http://
uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:hr:2006:AV0646> (accessed Mar. 11, 2015).
32  Article 19 of the dCPC codifies the parties’ right to be heard equally and stiputales expressis verbis 
that the judge does not ground his / her decision, detrimental to one of the parties, on documents 
or other evidence the other party has not been able to sufficiently react on.
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area of the second question of our analysis, namely as to what is truth, and we will 
discuss it below. For now, let us still concentrate on the first question.
russia has a long track of debate as to whether a court must find the truth in the 
process. this debate is a part a larger struggle between the so-called inquisitorial and 
adversarial models of process which has been in place in russia since the XIX century 
until now. It is assumed that the inquisitorial system requires a court to use every 
opportunity available to find truth, while the adversarial system concentrates more 
on the procedural balance of the parties in trial.33 however, the courts of Imperial russia, 
before they underwent the famous reforms of 1864, were criticized for being both 
inquisitorial and ineffective in searching for the truth at the same time: the process 
was mostly written and was based on the formalistic approach as to evidence.34 
After the reforms, the courts started being criticized for being too adversarial, ‘since 
an inexperienced party might build his position in a wrong way, might not provide 
necessary evidence, and thus fail in even the most righteous case’ (emphasis added).35 
this line of movement from the adversarial process back to the inquisitorial process 
received its complete realization in Art. 5 of the 1923 rsFr Civil Procedure Code and, 
consequently, in Art. 14 of the 1964 rsFsr Civil Procedure Code; both rules required 
courts to discover all actual circumstances and facts of a case irrespective of the positions 
of the parties thereto. In other words, soviet courts stuck to the facts as hard as dickens 
demanded in the novel mentioned by my learned co-author. After the dissolution of 
the soviet union, the inquisitorial approach has been again abdicated.
Currently russia has two instruments regulating civil procedure: Civil Procedure 
Code [hereinafter CPC], applied by courts of general jurisdiction in most civil cases, 
and Arbitration Procedure Code [hereinafter APC], applied by arbitration courts in 
commercial cases. Both of those instruments in identical language (Art. 12 CPC and 
Art. 9 APC) require as follows:
while retaining its independence objectivity and impartiality, the court shall 
lead the process, shall explain to the persons taking part in the case their 
rights and duties, shall warn of the consequences of the performance or 
non-performance of the procedural acts, shall render to the persons taking 
33  Малышев К.И. Курс гражданского судопроизводства. Т. 1 [Malyshev k.I. Kurs grazhdanskogo 
sudoproizvodstva. T. 1 [kronid I. Malyshev, 1 Course of Civil Proceedings]] (2nd ed., tipografiya M.M. 
stasyulevicha 1876]] (cited in Гражданский процесс: Хрестоматия: Учебное пособие [Grazhdansky 
protsess: Khrestomatiya: Uchebnoe posobie [Civil Procedure: Chrestomathy: textbook]] 207–208 (Mikhail 
k. treushnikov, ed.) (2nd ed., gorodets 2005) [hereinafter Civil Procedure: Chrestomathy]).
34  Гессен И.В. Судебная реформа [gessen I.V. Sudebnaya reforma [Iosif V. gessen, Judicial reform]] 7 
(tipolitografiya F. waisberga i P. gershunina 1905).
35  Яблочков Т.М. Учебник русского гражданского судопроизводства [yablochkov t.M. Uchebnik 
russkogo grazhdanskogo sudoproizvodstva [tikhon M. yablochkov, textbook on russian Civil 
Proceedings]] (2nd ed., knigoizdatel’stvo I.k. gassanova 1912) (cited in Civil Procedure: Chrestomathy, 
supra n. 33, at 213).
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part in the case assistance in exercising their rights, shall create conditions for 
an all-round and complete study of the proofs and for the establishment of 
actual circumstances and for the correct application of the legislation in the 
consideration and the resolution of civil cases.36
the legislative intent is quite obvious if we compare this rule with Art. 14 of the 
1964 rsFsr Civil Procedure Code: courts are not any more obliged to reveal all actual 
circumstances by themselves, they only provide conditions for their establishment in 
an adversarial trial. It is quite clear as well, why the search for truth was relinquished. 
soviet inquisitorial process was formalistic and ineffective; moreover, in criminal 
area it led to the repressions that are well-recorded in history. the changes in law 
were driven by the intention to make the process less formalistic and revive it by 
introducing competition in a dispute.
this novation, however, can hardly be considered effective.37 First of all, the Code 
preserved certain elements of inquisitorial process, such as an obligation of a court to 
establish certain specific facts (otherwise the judgment may not survive on appeal).38 
Moreover, the doctrine remained largely the same. Analyzing the changes, some 
authors stated cautiously that under the new law, russian courts do not have to 
seek for truth outside of what is posed by the parties to a dispute and the opposite 
would violate Art. 123 of the Constitution of the russian Federation.39 yet the others, 
including the acting judges of russian arbitration courts, disagreed and insisted 
that finding the truth, on the contrary, is essential for justice.40 of course, what 
36  russian Civil Procedure Code, translated by the wIPo, available at <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
lexdocs/laws/en/ru/ru081en.pdf> (accessed Mar. 11, 2015).
37  Решетникова И.В. Тенденции развития гражданского процессуального законодательства // 
Российский юридический журнал. 1999. № 1(21). С. 7 [reshetnikova I.V. Tendentsii razvitiya 
grazhdanskogo protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva // Rossiiskii yuridicheskii zhurnal. 1999. No. 1(21). 
s. 7 [Irina V. reshetnikova, Tendencies of Development of the Legislation on Civil Procedure, 1999(1) 
russian Juridical Journal 7]].
38  For example, for the purposes of damages claims it is specifically established by both the supreme 
Court and the supreme Arbitration (Commercial) Court that the calculation of damage must be 
confirmed by specified types of documents (Joint resolution of the Plenums of the both Courts No. 6/8 
of Jule 1, 1996). this type of rules is, in fact, one of the most effective guarantees against arbitrary 
decisions. For further discussion, see, e.g., Гражданский процесс: Учебник [Grazhdanskii protsess: 
Uchebnik [Civil Procedure: textbook]] 32–33 (Valery A. Musin et al., eds.) (Prospekt 1998).
39  Сапожников С.А., Устюжанинов В.А. Принцип состязательности и судебной истины в новом АПК 
РФ // Арбитражная практика. 2003. № 2. С. 31–34 [sapozhnikov s.A., ustyuzhaninov V.A. Printsip 
sostyazatel’nosti i sudebnoi istiny v novom APK RF // Arbitrazhnaya praktika. 2003. No. 2. s. 31–34 [sergey 
A. sapozhnikov & Vladimir A. ustyuzhaninov, The Principle of Adversarial Process and the Judicial Truth 
in the New Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, 2003(2) Arbitration Practice 31–34]].
40  Шумилова Л.Ф. Принципы состязательности и объективной истины как фундаментальные начала 
правоприменительной практики // Журнал российского права. 2005. № 11 [shumilova L.F. Printsipy 
sostyazatel’nosti i obyektivnoi istiny kak fundamental’nye nachala pravoprimenitel'noi praktiki // Zhurnal 
rossiiskogo prava. 2005. No. 11 [Lyudmila F. shumilova, Principles of Adversarial Process and Objective 
Truth as Fundamentals of the Law Enforcement Practice, 2005(11) Journal of russian Law]].
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seems to prevail in the doctrine and jurisprudence is a somewhat middle-ground 
position saying that both the search for truth and adversarial process can perfectly 
live together. while this idea looks great on paper, this suggestion may take strange 
forms in reality of life: after all, both of these concepts meet each in the head of one 
and the same person, the judge. the outcome of this meeting depends on his or her 
professionalism, experience, conscience and, frankly, imagination.
In russia there are no jury trials in civil cases. the russian judge is not only an 
administrator of an adversarial trial, he is also the one who examines the evidence 
(as russian law requires, ‘in accordance with his inherent conviction’), and renders 
a judgment based upon the facts that he himself considers established or proven. 
Possessing all these powers, he can simply tailor both the process and the judgment 
in order to reach the outcome that he considers fair and corresponding with the 
truth he believes. Judges admit that they are subjective in revealing objective facts 
and do not see any contradiction in that.41 the problem is that a judge might be 
mistaken in what exactly he considers the truth and where he found it.
however, it would be a mistake to think that russian civil process always entails 
searching for the truth, whatever it is meant to be. In fact, sometimes courts use the 
formality of adversarial process proclaimed in russian procedural law in order to refrain 
from reality. For example, in 1997 a district court in Moscow sustained the lawsuit by 
yury Luzhkov, then the mayor of Moscow, against the party ‘democratic Choice of 
russia’ and newspaper ‘russian telegraph’ for publicly calling the mayor ‘the richest 
businessman in the city, who took over everyone.’42 At the same time, it was a matter 
of common knowledge that Luzhkov’s wife was one of the major russian tycoons and 
that she earned all of her fortune within his years in office.43 In 2011, when Luzhkov left 
the office, the same court dismissed his claim against the duma head sergey Naryshkin 
who characterized Luzhkov’s management of city as ‘incompetent’ and ‘corrupt.’44
therefore, the answer to the first question seems to be as follows: courts are 
not required to search for the truth in the process, but they usually think that they 
should, and sometimes they really do.
41  Judge shumilova, currently serving in the 14th Appelate Arbirtation Court puts that as follows: ‘In 
order to have justice done in the case, the court’s findings must be based on undoubtly established 
facts. the judge, evaluating the evidence and taking measures to establish the truth in the case, is to 
some extent subjective, stating in its decision the arguments that led him to resolve the legal dispute 
on the right so and not otherwise. there are reasons of objective nature for that. It is clear that law 
enforcement agents act by perceiving and applying only the formal law, which contains general 
characteristics of the permissibility of a particular social behavior and, as a rule, not recognizing the 
individuality of the situation in which there may be a deviation from the normal social behavior. And 
this is understandable: the legislator cannot account for the diversity of life.’ shumilova, supra n. 41.
42  Боннер А.Т. Проблемы установления истины в гражданском процессе: Монография [Bonner A.t. 
Problemy ustanovleniya istiny v grazhdanskom protsesse [Alexander t. Bonner, Problems of Finding the 
truth in Civil Proceedings: Monograph]] (yuridicheskaya kniga 2009).
43  Id.
44  Id.
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6.2. What is Truth?
when Pilate asked Jesus, ‘what is truth?’, Jesus answered nothing, and Pilate went 
to the Jews and said to them, ‘I find no guilt in him.’
Philosophy offers several types of answers as to what the truth is. some authors 
thought that truth is what corresponds to objective reality, what exists as itself and 
irrespectively of anyone to perceive it (Aristotle, hegel, descartes). others opined 
that something becomes a matter of truth, only when it is confirmed empirically 
(Locke, schlick). yet, others think that truth is always a subjective thing and that it is 
constructed on the basis of one’s specific knowledge, previous experience, psychic 
features (Avenarius, Mach), or that it is a product of social agreement (kuhn, Poincare). 
Finally, there are also interesting, although maybe quite marginal, views that truth 
cannot be expressed or found (tarski) or even it does not exist at all (derrida). the 
way in which you perceive truth determines your journey in seeking the truth. It is 
quite easy to notice that only the first and the second views on truth make it possible 
to require courts to search for it.
soviet theory of legal process traditionally looks at the concept of truth-seeking 
through the prism of Lenin’s celebrated essay ‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.’45 
In that piece, Lenin argued that truth is an objective thing and it is fully cognizable 
through the use of the methods of dialectical materialism and elucidated those 
methods. Lenin was, indeed, not the first person that who used the term ‘objective 
truth;’ this stems from the works by Marx and Engels and, before them, descartes. 
still, it is in Lenin’s interpretation that the materialist theory received reflection in 
soviet procedural law.
the historical context of the essay is quite remarkable and yet important for 
our topic: it was written as a reaction to the work ‘Empiriomonism’ by Alexander 
Bogdanov, Lenin’s political rival within the Bolshevik party.46 some commentators 
suggest that the only aim of the essay was to destroy Bogdanov and his supporters 
in the political struggle, and that Lenin’s analysis could not be well-founded, because 
for the three weeks that were spent on the essay he was physically unable to read all 
45  Клейнман А.Ф. В.И. Ленин о законности, суде и прокуратуре [kleinman A.F. V.I. Lenin o zakonnosti, 
sude i prokurature [Alexander F. kleinman, V.I. Lenin on Legality, Courts and Prosecution]] 22 (Moscow 
state university Press 1961); Карева М.П. Учиться у В.И. Ленина разоблачению буржуазной 
идеологии и ревизионизма. (К 50-летию выхода в свет труда В.И. Ленина «Материализм 
и эмпириокритицизм») // Советское государство и право. 1959. № 6. С. 13–30 [kareva M.P. Uchit’sya 
u V.I. Lenina razoblacheniyu burzhuaznoi ideologii i revizionizma. (K 50-letiyu vykhoda v svet truda V.I. Lenina 
‘Materializm i empiriokrititsizm’) // Sovetskoye gosudarstrvo i pravo. 1959. No. 6. s. 13–30 [Mariya P. kareva, 
To Study from V.I. Lenin as to How to Unmask the Bourgeios Ideology and Revisionism. (To the 50th anniversary 
of publication of V.I. Lenin’s ‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism’), 1959(6) soviet state and Law 13–30]].
46  Bogdanov, now forgotten, was one of the eminent figures of his time; apart from being a socialist 
politician, he wrote science fiction and works on philosophy, culture and economics, he created his 
own science of ‘tectology’ and, in a way, provided a foundation for the systems theory. his death 
matched perfectly to the way he lived: he killed himself during a blood transfusion experiment that 
he carried out in the search for eternal youth. Further reading: Zenovia A. sochor, revolution and 
Culture: the Bogdanov-Lenin Contraversy (Cornell university Press 1988).
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the cited sources.47 the polemist language that Lenin employed in the essay provided 
a considerable hindrance in discerning the actual arguments in support of the 
Marxist views (but surely made the text attractive for any reader). Lenin concentrates 
on showing why his opponents are not Marxists, while the fact that Marxist views 
are right does not need any proof, in his opinion. this, of course, affected the later 
philosophy and legal practice.
Lenin shows why Bogdanov and some other Marxists authors are idealist, 
reactionist, and anti-Marxist and for that he needed to formulate what was Marxist to 
him. he bases the truly Marxist approach to material, knowledge and truth as follows: 
1) absolute objective truth exists and it is fully cognizable; 2) our knowledge about 
the absolute truth is relative (meaning relative truth), but it is getting more absolute 
with time and effort; 3) nature is governed by objective causality and necessity; 
4) human behavior is a product of objectively determined factors and not a free 
choice; 5) there is no place for presumptions and fictions such as ‘economy of human 
thought;’ 6) human thought is ‘economical’ only when it correctly reflects objective 
truth, and the criterion of this correctness is practice, experiment, and industry; and 
7) space and time are objective phenomena and not products of human mind. this 
formed the ‘new testament’ for our academic thinking.
these postulates received implementation in soviet philosophy and soviet law; 
for example, a major law professor olimpiad Ioffe wrote: ‘Legal scholarship does not 
create any special theory of causality, but generates, basing itself upon the categories 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the rules that would allow in their application to 
discern the causal link in every particular case.’48 started as a basis for cognition 
in soviet criminal process, the ‘Leninist testament’ then was adopted in the civil 
process as well.49
It is not the topic of this article to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
materialism. Moreover, Lenin’s ideas shown above seem to be rational and productive 
for judicial cognition. what was probably missing is the methodical body or protocol 
of procedures that would help a judge to achieve the stated goals. without the 
latter, this Leninist theory was at risk of dwindling into a vicious circle: requiring the 
proper evidence to reflect objective truth (which, in its turn, was to be discerned 
on the basis of proper evidence). we will look into the methods in the third part of 
this analysis.
47  robert service, Lenin: A Biography 193 (Macmillan Pub. 2000).
48  Иоффе О.С. Обязательственное право [Ioffe o.s. Obyazatel’stvennoe pravo [olimpiad s. Ioffe, Law 
of obligations]] 113 (yuridicheskaya literatura 1975).
49  Гурвич М.А. Принцип объективной истины советского гражданского процессуального права // 
Советское государство и право. 1964. № 9. С. 98–107 [gurvitch M.A. Printsip obyektivnoi istiny 
sovetskogo grazhdanskogo protsessual’nogo prava // Sovetskoye gosudarvstvo i pravo. 1964. No. 9. 
s. 98–107 [Mark A. gurvitch, Principle of Objective Truth of Soviet Civil Procedural Law, 1964(9) soviet 
state and Law 98–107]].
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so far, we have discussed what was truth for soviet civil procedure. But our main 
goal here is to provide the answer that the russian theory expects as to the question 
‘what is truth?’. we have observed above that russian law does not any more require 
the court to establish all the actual circumstances of a concrete case at bar; therefore, 
it might be wise to assume that the truth is understood differently in modern russia. 
this assumption becomes even more plausible given the modern developments 
of cognition in science, such as the experiments of knowledge representation by 
Bartlett and word superiority by krueger. Nevertheless, most modern publications on 
russian civil procedure do not show that there is any substantial change in regards 
to the concept of ‘objective truth:’ although most of the authors admit that the 
objective truth principle must yield to the needs of the adversarial process, they 
still believe that the truth is objective and cognizable. the main area of discussion 
is whether the truth that a court is seeking is an ‘objective truth’ or ‘relative truth,’ or 
a combination of those two Marxist-Leninist terms.50
Professor Anatoly Vlasov in his textbook mentions the ‘principle of judicial truth,’ 
according to which ‘a court may legally apply juridical norm not to some abstractions 
but to concrete legal facts, fully and correctly established in the order prescribed in 
the law.’ he expressly refuses to employ a term ‘objective truth’ in the beginning, but 
the more you read, the more you discern the Marxist discourse:51
In legal literature, the results of judicial cognition were taken as the objective 
truth. In this case, one can hardly agree with this statement, because truth 
cannot be ‘objective’ or ‘non-objective’ – either there is truth or it is no truth . . .  
Primarily, the results of the assessment of the materials of a case cannot be 
considered as absolute truth and be opposed to relative truth. Between these 
types of objective truth, there can be no impassable boundary. the simplest 
truth is always incomplete . . .
Could a result of judicial cognition be a true reflection of reality, i.e. whether 
it has a true character? this question should receive an affirmative answer. 
Judicial investigation of the facts of a case can and should lead to the full and 
correct knowledge of a particular set of facts relevant to the proper resolution 
of the case.
50  Бех К.А., Гривас О.Я. Принцип судебной истины в гражданском процессе и способы ее познания // 
Материалы V Международной студенческой электронной научной конференции «Студенческий 
научный форум» (15 февраля – 31 марта 2013 г.) [Bekh k.A., grivas o.ya. Printsip sudebnoi istiny 
v grazhdanskom protsesse i sposoby ee poznaniya // Materialy V Mezhdunarodnoi studencheskoi elektronnoi 
nauchnoi konferentsii ‘Studencheskii nauchnyi forum’ (15 fevralya – 31 marta 2013 g.) [kseniya A. 
Bech & olga ya. grivas, The Principle of Judicial Truth in Civil Procedure and the Means of Cognition 
Thereof, in Materials of the 5th International student Electronic scientific Conference ‘students 
scientific Forum’ (February 15 – March 31, 2013)]], <http://www.scienceforum.ru/2013/pdf/3622.
pdf> (accessed Mar. 11, 2015).
51  Власов А.А. Гражданское процессуальное право: Учебник [Vlasov A.A. Grazhdanskoe protsessual’noe 
pravo: Uchebnik [Anatoly A. Vlasov, Civil Procedural Law: textbook]] (Velbi 2003).
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Is it possible to call the outcome of legal knowledge an absolutely complete 
study of the circumstances of the case? In the theory of knowledge of dialectical 
materialism every act of cognition is seen as a dialectical combination, as the 
unity of the absolute and relative truths.
A prominent professor of civil procedure of Moscow state Law Academy, Maria 
shakaryan in her textbook also uses a term ‘judicial truth’ and appears to be more 
formalist and practical in her argument. she opined that there is no reason to spend 
state money on trial if it does not establish the truth, and, interestingly, the fact is 
truth is cognizable in principle flows from the law (and not from the nature, as one 
would think):52
Is such a tremendous change in the language of procedural norms [as 
opposed to the soviet procedural law – our addition] a ground to say that 
now the principle of objective (judicial) truth in civil procedure does not exist 
any more or at least is seriously limited?
In general terms, we would answer this question in the negative for the 
following reasons. It seems that the truth as the ultimate goal of civil 
procedure remains unchanged. only referring to the need to establish the 
actual circumstances of civil cases, the law establishes a rather complicated, 
time-consuming and costly procedure as civil proceedings.
In case if we agreed that the establishment of the truth as a goal of the process 
no longer exists, we would therefore have to abandon the civil proceedings 
as established by the procedural law the order of resolution of civil cases . . . 
It is extremely important to underline that notwithstanding that the changes 
in the law, many procedural theorists still think that it is possible to establish 
a truth in court. And this view is fully based upon the law.
Professor Mikhail treushnikov of Moscow state university opined in the most 
direct and clear way as to what the truth is (that the truth is the truth):53
If a court did not establish fully and correctly the real factual circumstances in 
the case, rights and obligations of the parties, i.e. the truth, then it cannot make 
a lawful decision. A true statement is a statement that correctly reflects objective 
reality. the truth in civil procedure means a correct statement of judge (judges) 
as to the really factual circumstances of a case in the right legal qualification.
52  Гражданское процессуальное право: Учебник [Grazhdanskoe protsessualnoe pravo: Uchebnik [Civil 
Procedural Law: textbook]] (Mariya s. shakaryan, ed.) (Prospekt 2004).
53  Гражданский процесс: Учебник [Grazhdanskii protsess: Uchebnik [Civil Procedure: textbook]] (Mikhail k. 
treushnikov, ed.) (2nd ed., gorodets 2007).
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there are, however, certain russian professors who do not seem to adhere to 
the majority’s Marxist truth discourse, such as Valery Musin of st. Petersburg state 
university (and his colleagues and pupils)54 as well as Vladimir yarkov55 and Irina 
reshetnikova of urals state Law Academy. But keeping silence as to the dialectical-
materialist concept of civil procedure, they do not appear to come up with something 
else that would form a philosophical foundation of the civil process for new russia. 
As a result, the Marxist-Leninist approach is still the most influential in the russian 
civil procedure doctrine.
Consequently, the answer to the question posed, i.e. ‘what is truth?’ in russian 
civil procedure is what correctly reflects the objective reality. or, more specifically, 
truth is what, in a judge’s correct statement, reflects the objective reality.
6.3. How to Find out the Truth?
My co-author provided an extensive account of the methodology as to how the 
dutch judge searches for truth. this methodology is not only extremely interesting; 
it may be the one that is so needed in the russian judicial system.
under the CPC, in every case a court must determine the ambit of circumstances 
to be established in the process. some of those circumstances are stipulated by the 
law or binding decisions of higher courts. these circumstances shall be proven as 
facts by the parties through the evidence they provide. Every party must prove what 
it refers to (unless another distribution of burden of proof is established by law). 
A judge assesses the evidence in accordance with his or her inherent conviction based 
on an all-out, complete, objective, and direct investigation of all of the evidence in 
the case, and no evidence has a predetermined value for a judge. Every piece of 
evidence must receive a finding as to its admissibility, relevance, and accuracy, and 
the evidence as a whole must be sufficient for a judgment to be rendered on its 
basis. In a judgment, a court must explain why it preferred certain evidence against 
an opposing piece of evidence. this, in very general terms, concludes the legal 
framework of judicial truth-seeking.
Following the adoption of the new CPC in 2002, russian supreme Court issued 
a celebrated resolution No. 23 of december 19, 2003, ‘on Judicial decision.’ In this 
binding resolution, the supreme Court specified the general characteristics that any 
judgment must satisfy. they are not many. under Art. 195 CPC, the judgment must 
be lawful and well-established. the supreme Court clarified these two terms and 
stated that a judgment is well-established when the facts relevant for the case are 
confirmed by the evidence assessed by the court that made the judgment. It also 
stipulated that a judgment must be divided into two parts, the motivation and the 
54  Civil Procedure: textbook, supra n. 39.
55  Гражданский процесс: Учебник [Grazhdanskii protsess: Uchebnik [Civil Procedure: textbook]] (Vladimir 
V. yarkov, ed.) (6th ed., wolters kluwer 2006).
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resolution, and that the facts established in the motivation must correspond to the 
conclusions made in the resolution. Finally, it stated that courts are not bound by 
the expert opinions submitted to them and they may look into the contents and 
methods of an expert examination. It must be noted that the resolution ‘on Judicial 
decision’ proved itself as an extremely useful tool to lower the level of arbitrariness 
in russian courts. But a tool against arbitrariness can hardly ensure that a court finds 
the truth that, in the terms of russian doctrine, reflects objective reality.
russian courts lack concrete methods of searching for truth. Professor Mark 
gurvitch, one of the most famous soviet jurists, argued, in a sense, that the objective 
truth will undoubtedly be found in the process, if the regular procedural guarantees 
are established, such as: equality of arms in adversarial process (although in the 
soviet union there was no adversarial process), as well as the menace of criminal 
liability for false testimony and appeals mechanisms, nothing else.56
russian judges are supposed to determine the accuracy of evidence (including 
the words of the parties) by assessing it ‘in accordance with their inner conviction’ 
and comparing various pieces of evidence taken together. they may also refer to 
experts, if the parties ask for that, but an expert opinion is not binding for them 
either. this provides enormous freedom of actions and, in the end of the day, leads 
to one basic question: which of the parties does a judge believe?
subjective belief takes considerable space in russian civil process. referring back 
to certain features of the basic philosophical foundation of the soviet civil process, 
Lenin’s ‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,’ Lenin was so sure that Marxism was right 
that he put it as an a priori truth outside of any discussion. An acting judge of an 
arbitration court in russia, also mentioned above, admits that she is sometimes 
subjective when she is looking for objective truth.
the third question posed in this article is as follows: how do Russian courts find the 
truth? the answer to this question will evidently require an all-out sociological survey, 
which is not an object of this comparative legal analysis. therefore, there will be no answer 
to this question now. however, a hypothesis, subject to future confirmation or disproof, 
would be as follows: It may very well be, that russian civil procedure puts as a theory 
a goal of finding objective truth, but, having no objective instruments for that, does so 
in the most subjective way possible: by putting a judge in a middle of indeterminacy 
and letting him or her make any decision without any meaningful guidance.
7. Conclusion
the search for truth in civil courts is an area of fierce debate both in the 
Netherlands and in russia. yet, in russia it is much less settled. the dutch legal 
system shows a more or less consolidated view as to whether the courts should seek 
for truth, how the truth should be perceived and sought in civil process. on the other 
56  gurvitch, supra n. 50.
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hand, russian law in this regard is still in transition from old soviet approaches to 
something new and quite unclear. the article shows a peculiar dominance of Marxist-
Leninist concepts in the modern russian doctrine and their practical implications. 
the approaches adopted in the Netherlands, a continental legal system just as russia 
itself, might be of use for the new russian civil procedure.
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